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Left Libertarianism: What’s in                        
It for Me? 
H. E. BABER* 
Left libertarianism cannot effectively promote equal opportunity for 
well-being.  Neither direct distributions from the rent fund nor financial 
incentives for firms will significantly reduce gross, ongoing discrimination 
which locks most women into a narrow range of boring, dead-end, pink 
collar drudge jobs and puts minorities at a disadvantage in hiring, 
housing, and access to credit.  Left libertarianism: What’s in it for me?  
Not much. 
I. 
Left libertarians hold first that agents fully own themselves, and 
second that natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian 
manner.  Peter Vallentyne argues that although discrimination is not 
intrinsically unjust on left libertarianism grounds and state prohibitions 
against it are, it is nevertheless unjust for the state, and many private 
individuals, to take no steps to offset the negative effects of systematic 
discrimination.1
Vallentyne focuses on private discrimination, discrimination by individuals 
as citizens, versus state discrimination.  Vallentyne is particularly concerned 
with discriminatory practices that are socially significant, presumably 
including race and gender discrimination in employment, housing, and 
 *  Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego. 
 1. Peter Vallentyne, Left Libertarianism and Private Discrimination, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 981 (2006). 




access to credit.2  These are among the “standard cases of racism and 
sexism,” which he holds are forms of “invidious discrimination” where:  
Invidious discrimination against an individual is . . . the treatment of an 
individual less favorably because of some feature one believes the individual to 
possess, where (1) the person is not morally or prudentially responsible for 
having the feature in question; and (2) the treatment is based on (a) a mistaken 
belief in the moral inferiority of those having the feature, (b) a significantly 
mistaken empirical belief about people having the feature, or (c) hatred of those 
having the feature.3   
Vallentyne argues that insofar as left libertarians are committed to agents’ 
full private ownership of self and property, standard cases of socially 
significant discrimination do not constitute wrongs against their victims. 
Full private ownership of an entity consists of a full set of the following 
ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the entity . . . ; (2) rights to 
compensation if someone uses the entity without one’s permission; (3) 
enforcement rights . . . ; (4) immunities against the non-consensual loss of these 
rights; and (5) rights to transfer any of these rights to others . . . .4
My refusal to hire an applicant for a job, to extend him credit, or to 
rent an apartment to him because of his race or sex does not violate any 
ownership rights he enjoys with respect to himself or artifacts that 
constitute his property, and thus does not violate his rights.  Some 
varieties of invidious discrimination do violate an individual’s right to 
property and self-ownership, such as lynching or defacing the property 
of minority residents, but the common or garden varieties do not.  Individuals, 
Vallentyne argues, “do not have a right not to be discriminated against 
on the basis of characteristics for which they are not responsible, or a 
right to be treated on the basis of their desert.”5
On this account, it would be unjust for the state to force me to refrain 
from discriminatory employment practices, discrimination in renting or 
selling property, or discrimination in extending credit.  Victims of such 
discriminatory practices are not wronged, so they cannot appeal to 
enforcement rights to license state intervention and, insofar as I own my 
house, money, or firm, or act as an agent of the owner, the state would 
violate my rights of ownership if it compelled me to hire, finance, or rent 
to an individual with whom I do not wish to do business—for whatever 
reason.  Nevertheless, left libertarians hold that natural resources belong, 
in some manner, to everyone equally, and the equality of opportunity for 
well-being version of left libertarianism imposes a duty of justice on 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 982-83. 
 4. Id. at 985. 
 5. Id. at 992. 
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individuals and the state acting on their behalf to promote equality of 
opportunity for all.6
How does this work?  Under a left libertarianism view, individuals 
hold ownership of natural resources conditional on the payment of rent 
to the commonweal.  According to equal opportunity left libertarianism, 
to which I will confine myself here, “the rent must be spent so as to 
efficiently promote equality of opportunity for well-being.”7  Discrimination 
undermines opportunities for well-being, and where individuals have 
worse than average prospects for well-being, they ought to be compensated 
from the rent fund to improve their opportunities for a good life.  Left 
libertarians, moreover, recognize a duty to promote equality of opportunity 
in the long run, so that in addition to compensating individuals, “the 
state has a duty of justice to use education and incentives to reduce 
future invidious discrimination.”8
There is, however, no special duty to compensate for discrimination as 
such, or to reduce its occurrence.  As Vallentyne notes, “[t]hose who 
suffer from invidious discrimination, but benefit from other brute luck 
advantages, may already have above average life prospects and thus may 
be owed no help.”9  Invidious discrimination is all of a piece with other 
life circumstances that undermine opportunities for well-being. 
In the section that follows, I argue that contrary to Vallentyne’s 
assumption, most significant discrimination on the basis of sex and race, 
particularly in employment and housing, is rational and therefore 
warrants intervention by the state or other agencies.  I consider Richard 
Arneson’s discussion of how even “mild” racial preferences may bring 
about extensive racial segregation, noting that in the case he considers 
along with a wide range of others, the taste for discrimination is itself a 
consequence of discriminatory practices which generate feedback 
effects.  Considering Alan Wertheimer’s observation that “reaction 
qualifications” may be bona fide occupational qualifications, I also note 
that accommodating the discriminatory tastes of clients, customers and 
coworkers quite often has the same result. 
In the final section, I pose some questions about whether the left 
libertarianism account can either provide a rationale for promoting 
 6. See id. (recommending an equality of opportunity for well-being version of left 
libertarianism). 
 7. Id. at 986. 
 8. Id. at 989. 
 9. Id. 




greater equality in opportunities for well-being and whether programs 
that are consistent with left libertarianism notions of full property 
ownership and self-ownership can contribute significantly either to 
promoting greater equality of opportunity or greater well-being. 
II. 
Most common varieties of sexism and racism do not involve hatred, 
mistaken beliefs about the moral inferiority of individuals, or mistaken 
empirical assumptions.  Discrimination is usually rational, and more 
often than not, innocent to the extent that perpetrators are not blameworthy.  
Nevertheless, discrimination undermines overall well-being. 
1. Discrimination Is Rational but Inefficient 
Employers discriminate for a variety of reasons.  Many have a taste 
for discrimination—they simply want employees who look the part and 
have no reason not to indulge their taste because most jobs can be done 
equally well by the majority of applicants.  The employment practices of 
a British pickle factory described by Collinson, Knights, and Collinson 
in Managing to Discriminate, which maintained virtually complete sex 
segregation in shop floor positions, are not atypical.  When, by a fluke, a 
man succeeded in getting work as a pickle-packer, a female-typed job, 
he was transferred to the loading dock within two days of his appointment: 
Although he was “pleased” to be moved, this was not due to a request by him, 
but rather was the decision of the female packing supervisor.  She explained, “I 
know I shouldn’t treat anyone differently, but he just didn’t look right on the 
packing line.  I think this is a woman’s job really.”10
In addition, employers need to accommodate the tastes of customers, 
clients, and coworkers who also prefer to deal with employees that look 
the part.  Fry’s Electronics’ customers want to buy gadgets from men.  
Thus Fry’s, rationally, hires only men for commissioned sales positions 
on the floor.  Fry’s employees in charge of personnel decisions do not 
hate women or regard them as morally inferior—and they are correct in 
believing that males will be more effective in selling their products 
because they know that most customers prefer dealing with men when 
they buy electronic gadgets. 
Because such sex discrimination in employment is rational, the market 
will not fix it.  However, markets are not perfectly efficient.  When 
discrimination is a response to the tastes of employers, customers, 
clients, and coworkers who prefer to deal with employees that “look 
 10. DAVID L. COLLINSON ET AL., MANAGING TO DISCRIMINATE, 115-16 (1990). 
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right,” discrimination becomes self-perpetuating and locks in suboptimal 
equilibria at which all players do as well as they can given the actual 
choices of others, but where players do worse overall than they would if 
they all made different choices. 
Consider, for example, the case of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White: 
In Memphis in 1997, Burlington Northern hired Sheila White to operate a 
forklift in its rail yard.  The other employees, all men, were furious—even 
though none of them had the qualifications to run the forklift—because forklift 
driver was considered the plum job.  White’s foreman and co-workers told her 
insistently that they didn’t think a woman should be working there in a rail 
yard . . . After a few months, White complained to her foreman’s manager about 
the harassment.  The foreman was suspended for 10 days.  But White, too, was 
punished: She lost the forklift job and was reassigned to plain old track labor, 
which all sides agreed was a dirtier and harder job.  Still later, she was 
suspended without pay for 37 days for being a “troublemaker.”  Only by 
bringing a union grievance did she retrieve her job—the track laborer spot, not 
the prized forklift spot—and her back wages.11
Burlington wasted White’s skills as a forklift operator in order to 
accommodate “furious” male employees.  However, the decisions to 
suspend and transfer her were rational.  White was a troublemaker 
insofar as her presence in an otherwise all-male crew caused trouble that 
was costly to the firm.  The cost, and the costs of dealing with the 
resentment and disruptive behavior of male coworkers’ resentment and 
disruptive behavior was greater than the cost of wasting White’s skills.  
The firm’s decision was, therefore, rational—even though both White 
and Burlington would have been better off, and other employees would 
have been no worse off, if White’s male coworkers did not have an 
expensive taste for discrimination. 
2.  Segregation Perpetuates the Taste for Discrimination 
Such expensive preferences are not typically immutable brute tastes 
but a consequence of sex segregation, which is itself the result of 
discriminatory practices.  Discrimination, which produces segregation, 
 11. E.J. Graff, Fighting for Fair Treatment, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE EDITION, Apr. 
27, 2006, http://www.prospect.org (search for “articleId=11454”; then follow “American 
Prospect Online–ViewWeb” hyperlink).  For a more extensive discussion, see Caroline 
Moses, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, Sheila, MEDILL–ON THE 
DOCKET, Dec. 5, 2005, available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/ 
003256.php (emphasis added).  See also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 




whether by sex or by race, quite often generates feedback effects that 
lock in suboptimal equilibria.  Consider, for example, discrimination in 
housing, which Richard Arneson suggests is a consequence of the “mild 
racial preferences” of individuals to avoid neighborhoods where they 
will be in a minority: 
   If one sees a sharply segregated housing segregation pattern (for example, 
African-Americans living next to African-Americans, whites living next to 
whites, and African-Americans living next to whites only at the neighborhoods’ 
edges) even though there is no legal requirement that forces this result, one 
might suppose that what explains the segregation is a strong desire of almost all 
members of one or both groups not to live in proximity to any members of the 
other group.  Schelling presented a simple model of the dynamics of residential 
housing choice that showed that mild racial preferences could lead to strongly 
segregated outcomes.  For example, if nobody wants to live in a neighborhood 
in which members of his racial group are a minority, and individuals occasionally 
move in and out of neighborhoods, eventually a strongly segregated pattern 
emerges.  In other words, segregation can emerge even if no one is averse to 
living in proximity to members of another race. 
   Plausibly, the mild racial preferences that Schelling showed capable of 
inducing segregated housing patterns are morally innocent.  It is not merely the 
case that they are not seriously morally wrong or not viciously racist.  Arguably, 
they are not wrong at all. 
   Nonetheless, the segregated housing patterns induced by a Schelling mechanism 
might be the cause of serious social harms.  To generate a simple example, imagine 
that children interact with other children who live nearby, that whites are 
wealthy and educated and African-Americans are poor and uneducated, and that 
interacting with children whose parents are wealthy and educated is a great 
boon if you are a child of poor and uneducated parents.  Also assume that 
contact with children whose parents are richer and more educated than yours 
increases your expected lifetime wealth and education prospects, and to a far 
greater degree than interacting with children whose parents are poorer and less 
educated diminishes your lifetime prospects.  Segregation in these imagined 
circumstances would do little, if anything, to help white children and would do a 
lot to hurt African-American children.12
It is common to dismiss such “mild racial preferences” as brute 
facts—at best data for psychoanalytic or sociobiological speculation 
whose etiology is irrelevant for purposes of policy.  But that is not quite 
right.  It is easy to see why whites, as rational choosers, prefer to live in 
neighborhoods where blacks are in the minority.  When blacks exceed 
“critical mass” in a neighborhood, both property value and prestige 
decline.  However, they do not decline because blacks are less diligent in 
maintaining their property than demographically matched whites, or 
because blacks have socially undesirable characteristics, or even because 
whites believe that they do, but because most Americans, black and 
white, expect property in predominantly black neighborhoods to be less 
 12. Richard J. Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
775, 775-76 (2006) (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 
135-66 (1978) (footnotes omitted)). 
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valuable, economically and socially, and because they know that most 
other Americans, black and white, have the same expectations.13
In this respect the housing market, which operates by second-guessing, is 
relatively insensitive to fundamentals.  White Americans, even if they 
themselves do not hate black Americans, or believe that they are morally 
inferior or that they are likely to trash their property, quite literally bank 
on white privilege in the form of the premium that buyers, also banking 
on white privilege, are willing to pay for housing in predominantly white 
neighborhoods.  Homeowners in predominantly black neighborhoods 
interested in relocating who have not banked the white neighborhood 
premium have a difficult time trading up or even finding comparable 
housing in predominantly white neighborhoods.  This can explain the 
persistence of racially segregated housing patterns without making any 
questionable assumptions about the pervasiveness of racial hatred, 
mistaken empirical beliefs about the characteristics of racial minorities, 
or even some “mild” biologically-based taste for clubbing together with 
tribes-mates. 
Segregated housing is pervasive in the U.S. and puts blacks, most of 
whom cannot bank the white neighborhood premium, at an economic 
disadvantage.  Discrimination in employment is the rule rather than the 
exception and sex segregation, in particular “horizontal” segregation, is 
pervasive.  Women are not only paid less in the aggregate than men and 
are more likely to occupy subordinate positions, but they are also locked 
out of a wide range of blue collar jobs.14  Because most women are 
 13. Furthermore, even prescinding from historical factors that put blacks at a 
disadvantage, “mild racial preference” as such puts members of minorities at a disadvantage.  
Suppose neither blues nor greens have ever been enslaved, oppressed, or thought to have 
undesirable social characteristics but that both blues and greens are averse to living in 
neighborhoods where members of their group are underrepresented.  Now assume that 
there are many more greens than blues.  Property values in green neighborhoods are 
likely to rise because there will be more potential buyers competing for housing. 
 14. For a lucid discussion of occupational segregation by sex and the theories 
proposed to explain it, see, for example, Richard Anker, Theories of Occupational 
Segregation by Sex: An Overview, 136 INT’L LAB. REV. 315 (1997).  For a more extensive but 
less lucid discussion, see MARIA CHARLES & DAVID B. GRUSKY, OCCUPATIONAL GHETTOS: 
THE WORLDWIDE SEGREGATION OF WOMEN & MEN (2004).  Most writers focus on vertical 
segregation, the tendency for women to be relegated to subordinate positions, which is 
disappearing rapidly in developed countries.  Arguably, horizontal segregation, which has not 
diminished to any appreciable degree, should be a matter of greater concern.  First, it has 
the effect of crowding women into a narrow range of jobs where, as a consequence, 
wages stay low.  Second and more importantly, it imposes severe constraints on women’s 
preference satisfaction by limiting the kinds of work that are, for all practical purposes, 
available to women. 




restricted to a narrow range of pink collar jobs, wages for these jobs 
remain low due to overcrowding in a handful of female-typed occupations.15  
This is invidious enough alone; nothing hangs on Vallentyne’s condition 
(2) for invidious discrimination, which stipulates that discrimination is 
invidious only if based on mistaken beliefs or hatred, so it is safe to 
ignore it.  If I am stuck behind the Wal-Mart checkout counter for eight 
hours a day it does not matter to me whether that is a result of market 
forces or a consequence of my employer’s “hatred” or mistaken views 
about my abilities or moral character.  What matters is that I am stuck, 
because I am locked out of a wide range of more desirable, better paid, 
less closely supervised, less boring, male-identified jobs which comparably 
qualified males can get. 
3. Proxies and Statistical Discrimination Have Expensive                     
Feedback Effects 
Where gender is concerned, at least in Western countries, bigotry, 
hatred, and false beliefs about moral status are rarely an issue.  Men and 
women have traditionally been separate but genuinely equal.  Women 
have fewer desirable opportunities in the labor market, but most women 
are not obliged to work outside the home full time and continuously 
from the time they complete their education until retirement.  Men, on 
the other hand, have many more opportunities in the world of work but 
labor under a burdensome breadwinner obligation.  Women, so the story 
runs, buy flexibility at the cost of desirable job options; men take on the 
breadwinner obligation and are rewarded with more desirable opportunities 
in the labor market. Prima facie, this seems a fair trade: what women 
gain on the swings men lose on the roundabouts and vice versa.  In the 
aggregate, men and women are equally well off even if they are differently 
off. 
Nevertheless, la difference makes both men and women worse off 
because such trade-offs do not reflect the ceteris paribus preferences of 
all men and women.  A woman might prefer to trade flexibility for 
higher earnings and improved job prospects, but that is a trade-off which 
most women do not get the chance to make because employers are 
reluctant to hire women for responsible positions requiring long-term 
commitment to the job, to provide firm-specific training, or offer women 
opportunities for advancement.  This is a rational decision on employers’ 
part.  Because women as a group are less likely to exhibit a high level of 
 15. This is Barbara R. Bergmann’s “overcrowding hypothesis.”  See Barbara R. 
Bergmann, Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate 
by Race or Sex, 1 E. ECON. J. 103 (1974). 
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commitment to the job than their male counterparts, employers, quite 
reasonably, take gender as a proxy for a range of characteristics that 
make workers poor investments.  Women, responding to employers’ 
policies, behave in the way that employers predict—exhibiting higher 
levels of absenteeism, quit behavior, and other characteristics that are, 
from employers’ perspective, undesirable.16
The foregoing is the classic case of feedback effect generated by 
statistical discrimination, which locks in what is arguably a suboptimal 
equilibrium: women do not invest in work because employers do not 
invest in women.  Employers do not invest in women because women do 
not invest in work.  Both women and employers are making the best 
choices they can, given one another’s choices, but everyone might be 
better off if everyone made different choices.  Arguably, what is wrong 
about using gender as a proxy in cases such as this is not that it is 
irrational—it is not—or that it is tough on anomalous “deserving” 
women who will invest in work if given a chance, or that it violates 
women’s rights, demeans, stigmatizes, or expresses wrongful values 
towards women.  What is wrong is that using gender as a proxy creates a 
 16. For discussion of the impact of such feedback effects see, for example, 
BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN (2d ed. 2005); 
FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARIANNE A. FERBER, & ANNE E. WINKLER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 214 (1998).  In discussing these effects, Linda Levine notes: 
Since women historically have tended to move in and out of the labor force 
more often than men, risk-adverse employers who rely on their impressions of 
the relative job turnover of all men and women when deciding about hiring 
individual men and women (i.e., statistical discrimination) would prefer men 
over women for primary sector jobs.  The outcome, some analysts claim, is 
that women are relegated to the secondary, low-paying sector of the labor 
market. 
   It is suggested that limiting women to poor job opportunities could make 
their alleged high turnover a self-fulfilling prophecy because the jobs provide 
women little reason to stay with any one employer.  Labor market discrimination 
could have other feedback effects “if it discourages women from making 
human capital investments, weakens their attachment to the labor force, and 
provides economic incentives for the family to place priority on the husband’s 
career.”  As a consequence of discrimination’s feedback effects on human capital 
variables, then, empirical studies that use these variables to explain the wage gap 
could understate discrimination’s impact.  Rather than the gender wage gap 
being due to either women’s choices or women’s constraints, the explanation 
likely is a mutually reinforcing combination of human capital differences 
between the sexes and discrimination against working women. 
LINDA LEVINE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE GENDER WAGE GAP AND PAY 
EQUITY (Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/98-278_20030421. 
pdf (quoting Blau, supra) (footnotes omitted) (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 




vicious circle that perpetuates a state of affairs in which both employers 
and employees are worse off than they would be if the male-breadwinner/ 
female-secondary-worker scheme were not locked in.  Employers would 
have a larger pool of committed workers from which to choose when 
deciding whom to hire, whom to train, and whom to promote; and 
women would have a wider range of opportunities. 
Likewise, employers’ attention to what Alan Wertheimer calls “reaction 
qualifications” may create vicious circles that perpetuate discrimination 
and leave everyone worse off as a consequence, not because it is 
irrational for employers to take reaction qualifications into consideration 
but precisely because it is rational to do so.  As Wertheimer notes, such 
characteristics may be bona fide occupational qualifications: 
[S]uppose that a law firm is considering candidates, one of whom is a former 
high ranking official in the Department of Justice.  He may be less talented than 
other applicants, but the firm has reason to believe that his high profile will 
bring more business.  If the law firm can reasonably aim to maximize its profits 
(rather than its legal talent), the former official may be the most qualified person 
for the job . . . .17
Even if the candidate is, in virtue of being less “talented” than other 
applicants less “deserving,” he is more qualified to the extent that clients 
will seek him out.  By the same reasoning, sex and race may figure as 
bona fide reaction qualifications.  In this respect, males are better qualified 
to sell Fry’s gadgets because customers believe that they are, while 
female forklift operators like Sheila White are less qualified than males 
with comparable technical skills precisely because male coworkers do not 
believe that they are qualified, suitable, or deserving. 
The difference between Wertheimer’s case and common or garden 
variety cases of discrimination, however, is that when employers take 
sex and race into account as reaction qualifications, they contribute to 
the perpetuation of undesirable feedback effects.  Sex and race figure as 
reaction qualifications in many occupations precisely because women, 
minorities or, in the case of female-identified occupations, men, are 
unrepresented or severely underrepresented.18  Supervisors, coworkers, 
customers, and clients prefer to do business with employees who look 
the part.  They question the competence of workers who are visibly 
anomalous, scrutinize their work more closely, and hold them to 
unrealistically high standards.  If members of underrepresented groups 
achieve critical mass, however, sex and race cease to be reaction 
 17. Alan Wertheimer, Reflections on Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945, 
949 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
 18. This is not true of what Yuracko calls “sex” and “plus-sex” jobs.  See Kimberly A. 
Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 172 (2004). 
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qualifications.  When Walter Cronkite, Douglas Edwards, Huntley, and 
Brinkley were the only show in town, women were less qualified to 
serve as television news anchors because they lacked relevant reaction 
qualifications—credibility and authority—that men had in virtue of 
viewers’ expectations.  Once women achieved critical mass in television 
journalism, viewers came to see female television journalists as normal, 
credible, and authoritative.  Thus, being male ceased to be an occupational 
qualification. 
This dynamic does not play out in cases like Wertheimer’s.  When law 
firms hire high profile hacks everyone in the office knows exactly what 
is going on, and clients soon find out as well.  Celebrity hiring does not 
generate significant feedback effects.  Moreover, because there are very 
few celebrities in the applicant pool, very few talented individuals will 
be displaced and the waste of skills, if any, will be minimal.  This is why 
we regard celebrity hiring “whimsical discrimination” and most instances of 
nepotism as relatively innocuous.19
Arneson, Wertheimer, and other contributors to this volume cite cases 
of discrimination, such as hiring on the basis of nonmeritocratic 
characteristics, that we should regard as innocuous or at least noninvidious.  
They ask, rhetorically, what is the difference between these cases and 
discrimination on the basis of race or sex?20  I have suggested that the 
difference is that neither whimsical hiring nor discrimination against 
non-celebrities, the old, the fat, or the ugly, generates the feedback effects 
that sex and race discrimination do.  Arguably, what makes these sorts of 
discrimination invidious is their propensity to generate expensive 
feedback effects. Discrimination is rational, and that is the problem. 
III. 
For many libertarians, right and left, market failures such as those I 
have described above are peripheral, if not completely off the map.  Left 
libertarians like Vallentyne, however, have special difficulties because 
they claim to have a serious interest in promoting equality of opportunity 
for well-being in an efficient manner.  Arguably, left libertarian notions 
concerning the egalitarian ownership of natural resources do not justify 
this aim, and the left libertarian program cannot effectively promote it. 
 19. See Arneson, supra note 12, at 784-86 (describing “whimsical discrimination”). 
 20. See Arneson, supra note 12; Wertheimer, supra note 17. 




1. The Rental System: Where the Elite Have Small Ecological Footprints 
It is not clear from Vallentyne’s exposition how the left libertarian 
rent system works, or how the duty to promote equality of opportunity 
for well-being is spun out of the egalitarian ownership of natural 
resources and our obligation to pay rent for our share in them.  How does 
equal ownership of land, air, water, or other natural resources translate 
into any right, even subject to constraints, to equal opportunity for well-
being?  Perhaps this is the idea: If I use less than my share of the natural 
resources, then individuals who use more than their share are renting 
little bits from me.  The state, or some other agency, acts as a rent 
collector, distributing rent for natural resources that individuals use in 
excess of their equal shares to individuals who use less than their equal 
shares in the form of opportunities for well-being. 
If so, it is hard to see how such an arrangement militates in favor of 
equality of opportunity for well-being.  These days, people who are very 
well off quite often have smaller ecological footprints than individuals 
who have far fewer opportunities for well-being.  Unless there is some 
very fancy way of calculating the share of natural resources an 
individual uses, a person’s opportunity for well-being is not a function of 
the quantity of natural resources he consumes or even the market value 
of these natural resources as such.  Take, for example, the following 
illustration: Moneybags lives on the 58th floor of a tiny but expensive 
Manhattan apartment; he rents no more than four square inches of 
expensive real estate.  Moneybags is a vegetarian and does not own a 
car.  The value of most of the yuppie goods he consumes—art, fine 
wine, and the like—is mainly in the labor that went into their production 
and the prestige they confer in virtue of which other yuppies are prepared to 
pay through the nose for them.  His natural resource consumption is low 
but his opportunities for well-being are vast.  On the other hand, 
Redneck lives in a sprawling ranch house, drives an SUV, hunts, and 
hikes.  He consumes lots of natural resources but has far fewer opportunities 
for well-being.  On any account of what natural resource consumption 
comes to, rednecks should be paying well-being rent to yuppies, further 
skewing the distribution of opportunities for well-being. 
Distributing rent funds to individuals who under-consume natural 
resources at the expense of those who over-consume may have some 
benefits when it comes to promoting ecologically responsible practices.21  
Such distribution is not, however, likely to result in a more equal 
distribution of well-being in industrial or post-industrial societies.  The 
single tax program that inspires left libertarianism has some plausibility 
 21. I am grateful to John Baber for making this point in conversation. 
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in a semi-feudal agrarian economy.22  But it is merely a contingent matter 
that in some circumstances, opportunities for well-being track access to 
natural resources.  Opportunities for well-being are not a function the 
market value of natural resources that individuals consume, and in 
developed, post-industrial economies the correlation between natural 
resource consumption and opportunities for well-being is very loose 
indeed. 
Left libertarians, insofar as they hold that “rent must be spent so as to 
efficiently promote equality of opportunity for well-being,”23 therefore 
face a dilemma.  Either distributions from the rent fund are based on the 
amount of resources individuals are “owed” in virtue of under-consumption 
or they are organized so as to promote equality of opportunity without 
regard to consumption.  Distribution according to the former scheme 
may not promote equality of opportunity for well-being and, indeed, in a 
developed economy may be counterproductive.  If, however, the left 
libertarian holds that the rent fund should pay out to individuals with 
below average opportunities for well-being regardless of their consumption 
of natural resources, then it is hard to see what the idea that natural 
resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner is doing for left 
libertarianism.  Distributing rent funds according to this scheme looks 
more like an implementation of the simpler, more familiar dictum: from 
each according to his ability; to each according to his need. 
2. “Money Can’t Buy Happiness”: Goods that Produce                                                    
Welfare Are Not Fungible 
The types of compensation individuals with few opportunities for 
well-being can legitimately receive under the left libertarianism rent 
fund theory do not do a very good job in improving well-being 
opportunities for most victims of discrimination.  In some cases, monetary 
compensation replaces opportunities lost through discrimination.  If the 
state provides blacks, who have less access to credit than whites 
because of discrimination, with low interest loans or grants to 
compensate for the disadvantages they suffer as a consequence of the 
decisions of private lenders, the problem is fixed.  Money is money and 
 22. In a semi-feudal agrarian economy, most participants are large landowners, 
small-holders, or landless peasants and most wealth is in the land so that land ownership 
and consumption of natural resources track the extent of individuals’ opportunities for 
well-being tightly. 
 23. Vallentyne, supra note 1, at 986. 




it does not matter where it comes from.  But monetary grants do not fix 
discrimination in employment even if they provide some compensation 
by way of alternative opportunities for well-being.  Monetary compensation 
does not help much if people are stuck doing jobs they hate; currency is 
fungible—employment is not.  Given that differences in individual tastes 
do not tightly track sex or race, ceteris paribus, a state of affairs in 
which individuals have different opportunities by virtue of their sex and 
race is less conducive to overall preference satisfaction than one in 
which all individuals have the same opportunities. 
Arguably, what makes discrimination bad is not that it treats some 
individuals “less favorably” by virtue of their sex, race, or other ascribed 
characteristics, but simply because discrimination treats them differently.  
If a restaurant assigns whites to wait on tables, but assigns people of 
color to invisible jobs in the kitchen to accommodate customer tastes, it 
still undermines all employees’ opportunities for well-being to the extent 
that it restricts their options for getting the kind of work they find least 
objectionable, even if it provides equal wages and benefits, or pays 
kitchen staff more to compensate for not getting tips.  There may be 
some whites who are adverse to extensive contact with the public and 
would therefore prefer kitchen work to waiting tables, or blacks with an 
aversion to the grease and smells in the kitchen who would prefer 
waiting tables.  Even if the distribution of preferences or the earnings 
from serving and kitchen work are the same among black and white 
employees so that each are equally well off in the aggregate, employees 
overall are less well off than they would be if they had a wider range of 
job options.  Shy whites and fastidious blacks lose out. 
Currently, most men and women compete in a dual job market.  In 
particular, occupations for men and women without college degrees are 
highly sex segregated.  Moreover, women not only have different job 
options than men, they have far fewer options.  Evelyn Murphy notes 
that two-thirds of all females employed in the U.S. are crowded into 
twenty-one out of five hundred occupational categories.24  According to 
one popular view, women’s restricted job options do not diminish their 
opportunities for well-being.  Rather, women crowd into a narrow range 
of female-typed jobs because they have a taste for nurturance, service, 
and social interaction and an aversion to work that is physically demanding, 
dirty, or dangerous because they are better able to cope with boredom 
than men and because they willingly trade off higher pay to satisfy their 
preferences.  If this view is accurate, the gendered division of labor is 
unobjectionable. 
 24. EVELYN F. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN 146 (2005). 
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To examine whether this hypothesis is plausible, however, let us 
consider how much working class women pay for clean, safe, and 
physically undemanding work that provides opportunities for nurturance, 
service, and social interaction.  Mechanics earn on average $669 per 
week while female clerical workers average $512 per week and female 
service workers earn $366 per week.25  Now, it may be that female 
clerical workers are willingly pay $157 per week ($8164 per year) to 
avoid getting dirty and that female service workers, who earn on the 
average $19,032 per year, are willingly pay a $15,756 premium to avoid 
getting dirty and to indulge their craving to serve customers.  Assuming 
that women in pink collar occupations could, if they so chose, get work 
in blue collar trades where wages are comparable to auto mechanics’ 
pay, the choice to perform traditional women’s work would cash out as a 
23% pay cut for female clerical workers and a 45% loss for female 
service workers. 
It seems unlikely that women whose earnings are low to begin with 
are so averse to male-typed work that they willingly absorb so big a 
financial hit.  This strongly suggests that working class women crowd 
into the pink collar ghetto because they have no viable alternatives—
either because the costs of blue collar employment are significantly 
higher for women than they are for their male counterparts or, more 
likely, because most women know that they will not be seriously 
considered for blue collar jobs and therefore do not apply for them or 
invest in training that they have good reason to believe will be wasted. 
 25. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN, supra note 16.  Eighteen 
percent of male workers have jobs in the skilled crafts, which are relatively high paying 
and do not require a college education, but not even one percent of women workers have 
such jobs.  Id.  The male mechanic’s $669 weekly paycheck, as compared with the 
female clerical worker’s average of $512 or the female service worker’s average of $366 
shows the crucial advantage of men over women in the part of the population that has not 
been to college.  Id.  “The inability of non-college women to get crafts jobs virtually 
condemns such a woman to a low standard of living if she finds herself with a child or 
two and lacks a man” who will share his income with her.  Id.  In this respect, the labor 
market has not improved since the 1970s.  Id.  The crafts jobs all require training.  Some 
of this training is at the discretion of the employer, who may exclude women.  Some 
training is obtained in public vocational schools, which remain highly segregated by sex.  
The women who are excluded from skilled crafts jobs as carpenters or electricians swell 
the ranks of those competing for unskilled work.  The presence of these extra people 
competing for these jobs lowers the wage in these poor-paying jobs from that which it 
would be otherwise.  This crowding hurts the workers who would, even in the absence of 
discrimination, still be in a dead-end, low-skill job. 




If this is so then it seems likely that because most women are confined 
to a narrow range of female-typed work there are a number of women 
who are seriously miserable because of the work they must do.  Left 
libertarians cannot support equal opportunity or affirmative action 
regulations that would enable women to obtain male-typed jobs.  The 
best they can offer, given their principles, is financial compensation 
from the rent fund so that women who find traditional “women’s jobs” 
intolerable can avoid work altogether.  This would be beneficial to the 
extent that it would relieve overcrowding in pink collar occupations so 
that wages would rise and working conditions might improve—at the 
cost of creating an unproductive renter class of Welfare Queens.  
However, the Welfare Queen option would not do much to improve the 
well-being opportunities of women who want to work for a living but do 
not want to be restricted to the narrow range of pink collar jobs currently 
available to them. 
The problem is that left libertarianism trades in rent funds but aims at 
welfare.  When it comes to work, however, the power of money to buy 
happiness or alleviate misery is limited. The intrinsic character of work 
is most important, even when it comes to occupations that do not require 
a college degree.  Discrimination in employment prevents individuals 
from making the trade-offs they prefer to satisfy their tastes and forces 
people into occupations to which they are averse, seriously undermining 
opportunities for well-being.  Distributions from the rent fund do little to 
offset the loss in opportunities for well-being arising from discriminatory 
practices that lock most women into a narrow range of pink collar jobs.  
Even if the left libertarianism agency, drawing from the rent fund, topped 
off wages for female-typed occupations so that pink collar workers 
earned as much as their blue collar counterparts, discrimination in 
employment to the extent that it restricts the vocational options of both 
men and women would still significantly undermine opportunities for 
well-being.  Individuals who were seriously averse to gender-appropriate 
work in particular would lose out. 
Money or alternative opportunities for well-being are compensation of 
a sort—in the way that financial settlements are compensation for false 
imprisonment—but nothing can make up for doing time at a job you 
hate.  This is the most compelling reason why anyone with a serious 
interest in promoting equal opportunities for well-being should prefer 
affirmative action and the enforcement of antidiscrimination policies to 
compensation from a left libertarian rent fund.26
 26. Few discussions of discrimination take “horizontal” sex segregation in 
occupations that do not require a college degree seriously.  Arguably, however, we 
should take it much more seriously than such “vertical” sex segregation as exists for 
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3. Promoting Equality of Opportunity in the Long Run 
Once again, the constraints under which left libertarians operate with 
regard to the duty to promote equality of opportunity in the long run and 
minimize future invidious discrimination, make things difficult.  
Vallentyne notes that education and incentives are legitimate means for 
counteracting discrimination.27  However, while providing educational 
opportunities and incentives to women and minorities may diminish 
segregation that is the consequence of past discrimination, it seems 
unlikely to have much effect on continuing discrimination. 
Education enables a minority of women to gain access to a number of 
desirable, well-paid jobs.  While there are male-female wage gaps for 
every occupation, the male-female wage gap for college graduates as a 
group is smaller than it is for less educated groups, in part because there 
is much less horizontal sex segregation at the high end of the labor 
market.  If a woman goes to college she gets access to a wider range of 
jobs and will make more money, which is no surprise.  But realistically, 
not everyone can get through college.  Even if they did, we would still 
have many college graduates working at Wal-Mart.  After all, someone 
must still occupy the pink and blue collar jobs. 
While sex segregation in jobs that require a college degree has 
decreased dramatically since 1980, sex segregation in working class 
occupations has not budged, in large part because women remain locked 
out of traditional blue collar occupations.28  Education enables some 
women to get out of the pink collar ghetto by escaping from the segment 
of the labor market in which discrimination is most pervasive.  This is 
why there are now many more women than men at universities in all 
affluent countries.  But even if the increased educational attainment of 
women shrinks the pool of female applicants for low-end pink collar 
high-end jobs if for no other reason than that there are three times as many Americans 
who have not completed college than there are Americans with undergraduate or 
advanced degrees.  I suspect many of us overlook the seriousness of horizontal sex 
segregation in pink and blue collar occupations because we assume, without reason or 
reflection, that all “bad” jobs—jobs we would not do—are equally bad and that in any 
case that the people who do these jobs do not get bored as easily as we smart people do 
and therefore do not suffer as much as we would if we had to do their jobs.  I also 
suspect that male academics in particular find it difficult to believe that working class 
women are seriously disadvantaged because they cannot get blue collar jobs, because 
they are a self-selected group who are especially averse to blue collar work insofar as 
they have invested in education to avoid it. 
 27. Vallentyne, supra note 1, 988. 
 28. See, e.g., ROBERT CHERRY, WHO GETS THE GOOD JOBS? (2001). 
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jobs (and so boosts wages), it is not likely to improve the job prospects 
for women at the low end. 
As to incentives, Vallentyne does not clearly express what he has in 
mind.  One type of incentive that might effectively decrease sex 
segregation would be an incentive to encourage girls to become involved 
in hard sciences and engineering.  It seems likely that there are small on-
the-average male-female differences in mathematical aptitude, but also 
that they are not nearly large enough to explain why there are so few 
women in math-heavy scientific areas.  Nevertheless, not all women, or 
men, can be scientists or engineers, and in any case such an incentive 
program does not address the far more significant effects of discrimination 
on the majority of women who compete in the non-college labor market.  
There are proportionately many more women in the sciences than there 
are in traditional blue collar trades, and proportionately more women 
engineers than women working in Fry’s commissioned sales positions 
pretending to be engineers.  It would also likely be beneficial to provide 
incentives to induce young black males to stay in school and out of jail, 
although it is not clear what sorts of incentives would prove efficacious.  
Moreover, staying in school is not going to do young black males any 
good if they continue to face discrimination in employment. 
Both programs, I take it, would be consistent with left libertarian 
principles—and very good things.  However, they would not have any 
direct effect on discrimination by sex and race, which occurs when 
employers take sex and race into consideration in dealing with individuals 
who are otherwise qualified in virtue of their education, training, and 
skills.  Optimistic scenarios promoting the benefits of education underestimate 
the extent of ongoing discrimination: they assume that women and 
minorities are currently disadvantaged primarily as a consequence of 
human capital deficits or psychological factors that are a result of past 
discrimination.  That is false: the fault is almost never in ourselves and 
almost always in our stars.  Discrimination is ongoing because, as I have 
argued, it is rational.  Incentives to encourage women to train for blue 
collar jobs are unlikely to have much effect because women are rational 
and know that they will not be seriously considered for such jobs. 
The only incentives and educational programs that address ongoing 
discrimination are those directed at perpetrators.  It is, however, unlikely 
that educational efforts or propaganda directed at them will have much 
effect because, as we have seen, most discrimination is rational.  Owners 
of upscale restaurants may believe that discrimination is “bad” but still 
reserve table serving jobs for white males in order to achieve an 
ambiance for which customers will pay.  Real estate agents who are not 
racists will continue to steer white clients to white areas in order to 
collect their commission on the white neighborhood premium. 
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Offering carrots is consistent with the left libertarianism view, but 
threatening the stick is not.  The “Rent Bureau” can bribe but it cannot 
punish; it can subsidize firms which promote blacks and hire women for 
male-typed work to offset the losses they may incur through hiring 
employees who lack reaction qualifications in virtue of race or sex and 
bribe them to take on “troublemakers” like Sheila White,29 but it cannot 
fine them for continuing to discriminate or impose any other disincentives 
that would violate their full property ownership and self-ownership 
rights. 
It is unlikely that bribery will be effective.  Women have always 
worked for less and yet employers have been prepared to pay a premium 
to hire men for “men’s jobs.”  Members of disadvantaged racial and 
ethnic minorities have also been willing to work for less but, once again, 
continue to face discrimination in employment.  The civil rights movement 
achieved results by liberal use of the stick—by boycotts and sit-ins, by 
forced integration of the schools, backed by National Guard troops and 
legal action.  There is some evidence that when it comes to discrimination, 
the stick is effective and the carrot will not do. 
4. Running the Rent Bureau 
Finally, there is reason to be concerned about the efficiency of policies 
for promoting equality of opportunity for well-being that are consistent 
with the left libertarian theory vis-à-vis regulations forbidding discrimination.  
Managing the left libertarian scheme for allocating compensation, 
education, and incentives from the rent fund’s stash to promote equality 
of well-being will take many economists, psychologists, sociologists, 
ethicists, and support staff working fulltime at the Rent Bureau and 
continuously tinkering.  I cannot even imagine how, for practical purposes, 
this would be accomplished.  It is expensive, impractical, inefficient, and 
just crazy. 
Right libertarians would likely concur and would also add that 
mechanisms for antidiscrimination regulations and affirmative action 
policies are equally expensive, impractical, inefficient, and crazy.  I am 
not sure that this has to be so.  Currently, the mechanisms for enforcing 
antidiscrimination regulations are costly, cumbersome, and inefficient, 
though arguably, not nearly so expensive and as would be the operations 
 29 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 




of a left libertarian Rent Bureau occupied by elaborate well-being 
calculations.  But there may be room for improvement if the mechanism 
for enforcing antidiscrimination regulations were comparable to those 
for enforcing workplace safety regulations or health regulations. 
Consider a case of “plain old discrimination” described by Evelyn 
Murphy in Getting Even: 
In 1998, Ernest Talley’s Renters Choice chain of rent-to-own stores acquired 
Rent-A-Center . . . Immediately, Talley and his senior vice presidents fanned 
out across the country to explain to the newly acquired managers that there 
would be no women at RAC.  The weight-lifting requirements for the job had 
been fifty pounds; Talley raised it to seventy-five pounds because, he 
explained—as many managers later testified—it “would keep women from 
applying.” 
A few men tried to stand up against the policy—and lost. . . . [M]ost who tried 
to resist the female-free juggernaut quickly decided it wasn’t worth their 
jobs . . . . [L]iterally dozens of midlevel managers from across the country, in 
separate and uncoordinated depositions, testified that the top executives and 
senior managers who were their direct reports had said such things as “In case 
you didn’t notice, we do not employ women” and “I regularly throw away 
women’s applications” 
. . . . 
. . . As a result, after a few years of legal skirmishing, in 2002 RAC agreed to 
pay out $47 million, revamp its personnel policies and procedures, and submit 
to EEOC oversight for four years.  But while the few named plaintiffs got lump 
sums of either $100,000 or $55,000, taxable as a single year’s income, the rest 
of that money had to be spread out over thousands of women, who, on average, 
received a lump-sum payment of less than $10,000 each—not enough to make 
up for their three years of lost wages, much less the strain and exhaustion of 
being disparaged and hounded daily.30
What is striking about this case is not only that it occurred long after sex 
discrimination had been prohibited by law, but the way in which it was 
handled—and had to be handled given the way in which the EEOC was 
required to operate.  Discrimination in hiring is treated as an anomaly to 
be handled by the courts ex post facto in response to complaints, rather 
than a common practice to be eliminated through monitoring, regular 
inspections, and routine fines for noncompliance.  Employers who 
discriminate are treated like doctors guilty of malpractice and unlike 
stores that sell products after their pull dates or contractors who send 
workers onto construction sites without hardhats. 
Of course, right libertarians, with the courage of their convictions, 
who regard health and safety regulations as illegitimate interference in 
business activities motivated by unwarranted paternalism, are no more 
sympathetic to OSHA or the Board of Health than they are to the EEOC.  
If workers choose to live dangerously, that is their business; if a supermarket 
 30. MURPHY, supra note 24, at 56-57. 
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sells rotten meat consumers will find out, even if it takes a few high 
profile cases of E. coli, and take their business elsewhere.  Most of us, 
however, are happy with state regulation in the interests of maintaining 
health standards and workplace safety. 
Arguably, it is not antidiscrimination regulation so much as the 
mechanisms by which regulations are enforced that burden employers 
and motivate resistance.  Employers know that they are unlikely to be 
called on discrimination.  Employees are in a poor position to complain 
and fear reprisals; job applicants are in no position to prove discrimination.  
They also worry that, given the way in which the system operates, if 
they hire “nontraditional” applicants they run the risk of expensive 
litigation if they demote or fire them.  This is merely a consequence of 
the way in which antidiscrimination regulations are enforced rather than 
the regulations as such.  If the EEOC had operated more like OSHA or 
the Board of Health, it is unlikely that Renters’ Choice would have 
either implemented its discriminatory hiring policies, gone through “a 
few years of legal skirmishing,” or been socked with multimillion dollar 
settlement costs at the end of the road.  If the employment practices of 
firms were monitored as a matter of course there would have been 
questions about why weight-lifting requirements had suddenly been 
raised (was the merchandise suddenly heavier?) and why there were few 
or no female applicants for jobs where there was no significant “pipeline” 
constraint.  Current schemes for promoting equality of opportunity for 
well-being could stand improvement, but arguably, the left libertarian 
program is significantly less efficient and unlikely to be effective. 
IV. 
If you are going to be a libertarian at all, you might as well be a right 
libertarian.  The doctrines of full property ownership and self-ownership 
impose constraints, which even given the assumption that natural 
resources are owned “in some egalitarian manner,” are not conducive to 
equality of opportunity for well-being.  Left libertarians seek to offset 
well-being deficits that arise from discriminatory practices and to 
discourage future discrimination but only insofar as that can be done via 
distributions from the rent fund and resources that rent money can buy.  
This program will not go very far either in compensating women and 
minorities for restricted opportunities due to discrimination, or in 
breaking the vicious circles that perpetuate discriminatory practices. 




Under the left libertarian regime, whites will continue to bank their 
white neighborhood premiums and flee to ever more remote suburbs 
when blacks achieve critical mass in their neighborhoods—until white 
voortrekkers moving back to gentrify city neighborhoods squeeze out 
black renters and begin the cycle all over again.  Most women will 
remain locked into pink collar jobs.31  Women foolish enough to take 
advantage of rent fund subsidies to train for “nontraditional” occupations 
will not be taken seriously when they apply for “men’s jobs.”  Employers 
who respond to incentives to hire women will collect their subsidies 
from the Rent Bureau and give women job assignments that do not 
provoke male coworkers or disturb clients who want employees with 
whom they do business to look the part. 
This is not much different from the way things were when I went to 
college to escape from my clerk/typist job at a local bus company, 
grubbed for grades in fear and trembling, and fought my way through 
graduate school in order to get into the high end of the job market where 
sex segregation was not an issue.  When I was working at Inter-City 
Transportation Company, I would have been happy to receive distributions 
from a rent fund, but even if they equaled or exceeded the difference 
between my wages and the earnings of male bus drivers whose pay slips 
I filed, I would have much rather been driving a bus. 
Sex segregation in employment does not just affect working class 
women—who we are inclined to forget represent three-quarters of the 
female population in the United States.  Sex segregation affects all 
women because it means that for us there are no fallback positions or 
safety nets.  Career housewifing is no longer an option—men will not 
guarantee lifelong financial support—so unless we catch the brass ring, 
which most of us cannot catch since brass rings are in short supply, we 
will spend most of our lives in pink collar jobs “caring, cashiering, 
catering, cleaning, [or doing] clerical work.”32  Unless left libertarians 
have some more elaborate schemes up their sleeves for getting women a 
real shot at male-typed jobs I do not see much in the program for me. 
 
 31. Id. at 146.  In 2000, two-thirds of all women working in the U.S. remained 
crowded into twenty-one occupations out of five hundred job titles, constituting eighty to 
ninety-eight percent of the workers in those categories.  Id.; see also supra text 
accompanying note 24. 
 32. Fred Halliday, The Forward March of Women Halted?, OPEN DEMOCRACY, 
May 5, 2006, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/women_march_ 
3510.jsp (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
